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Introduction
On July 22, 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2298 supporting efforts by the Organi-
sation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to remove chemical weapons from Libya and facilitate
their destruction in another country.' This resolution was critical to the international effort to prevent chemical
weapons in Libya from being at risk of acquisition by members of the so-called Islamic State operating in Libya.
Background
As part of renouncing weapons of mass destruction, Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
in 2004.2 Libya started a chemical weapons program in the 1980s and had capabilities to produce chemical weapons
by the 1990s. Libya refused to join the CWC after it was opened for signature in 1993. Its accession to the CWC
in 2004 meant Libya had to destroy its chemical weapons, including stockpiles of precursor chemicals.4 The OPCW
declared in May 2014 that Libya had destroyed all its Category I chemical weapons.5
However, unrest in Libya following the Security Council-authorized military intervention in 20116 prevented the
Libyan government from making progress on destroying stockpiles of Category 2 chemical weapons.7 Further, the
overthrow of the regime of Muammar Qadhafi resulted in the discovery of previously undisclosed stockpiles of
chemical weapons.8 Instability in post-intervention Libya and the weakness of government authorities created con-
cerns that nonstate actors in Libya might gain access to poorly secured chemical weapons and attempt to use them.
This concern grew urgent as, in late 2014, the Islamic State began operating in Libya, including by gaining control
of territory in and around the city of Sirte in 2015.9 Islamic State attacks near sites storing stockpiles of Category
2 chemical weapons alarmed officials in Libya and other countries, such as the United States.' 0 As 2015 ended and
2016 began, the threat of the Islamic State gaining access to these stockpiles grew," and Libya started reaching
out to the OPCW and other countries for help in addressing this problem.1 2
The Removal of Chemical Weapons from Syria as a Template
The CWC prohibits states parties from transferring chemical weapons to anyone.' 3 However, in resolving the crisis
triggered by the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, the United States and Russia, supported by the OPCW
and the Security Council, crafted a strategy under which Syria acceded to the CWC and transferred chemical weap-
ons out of its territory for destruction elsewhere.1 4 Implementing this strategy required decisions from the OPCW
Executive Council' 5 and the Security Council' 6 to provide a legal basis for Syria to transfer chemical weapons to
other countries that agreed to destroy them.17
Although the Syrian situation in 2013 and the Libyan context of 2016 are different, Libya and countries concerned
about the Islamic State gaining access to Libyan stockpiles of chemical weapons saw the strategy for Syria as rel-
evant for addressing the Libyan problem. In handling the Syrian situation, the OPCW made clear that its decisions
reflected the extraordinary circumstances in Syria and, thus, created no precedent for the future.' 8 Even so, what
was done in Syria provided a way to confront dangers in Libya associated with terrorists gaining access to chemical
weapons.
Security Council Resolution 2298
In Resolution 2298, the Security Council exercised its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to support
removing Libya's remaining chemical weapons from the country and having them transported for destruction else-
where. First, the Security Council endorsed the OPCW Executive Council's decision made two days earlier request-
ing the OPCW Director-General develop a modified plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining chemical weap-
ons.19 This endorsement strengthened the legal basis for Libya to transfer its remaining chemical weapons outside
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its territory for destruction. Neither the OPCW Executive Council nor the Security Council expressly discussed
removing these weapons from Libya, an outcome reflecting the need to avoid drawing too much attention to the
strategy being devised.2 0
Second, the Security Council decided to authorize UN member states to "acquire, control, transport, transfer and
destroy chemical weapons identified by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the elimination of Libya's chemical weapons stockpile in the soonest
and safest manner." 2 1 This decision provided other countries with the legal basis to receive, transport, and destroy
the Libyan chemical weapons. 22 The language used is identical to the Security Council's decision in 2013 autho-
rizing UN member states to participate in the transfer of chemical weapons out of Syria for destruction.2 3
The Security Council also used the resolution to remind UN member states of their obligations under Resolution
154024 to "take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery" into the hands of nonstate actors. 2 5 The Libyan gov-
ernment worked with the OPCW to remove its remaining chemical weapons from its territory in order to prevent
terrorists from getting access to them. The need for this approach reflected Libya's inability to establish effective
domestic controls over its chemical weapons, but Libya's willingness to work with the OPCW to prevent terrorist
access demonstrated its commitment to the objective of Resolution 1540.
Conclusion
Security Council Resolution 2298 helped pave the way for the successful removal of Libya's remaining chemical
weapons from that troubled country and their secure transport by Danish and British vessels to Germany, where
they will be safely destroyed.2 6 In adopting the resolution, the Security Council effectively exercised its powers
to safeguard international peace and security, advanced the CWC's disarmament and nonproliferation objectives,
and contributed to ensuring terrorists never get their hands on chemical weapons in Libya.2 7
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